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Article 23

MEXICO'S FEDERAL ORGANIZED CRIME ACT
RODRIGO LABARDINI*
In discussing the Mexican Federal Organized Crime Act, or Ley FederalContra
la Delincuencia Organizada (LFDO),' I will focus on drug trafficking as the most
pervasive form of organized crime in Mexico. However, I will be making references
to other types of organized crime throughout this paper as well.
The fight against drugs in Mexico has been a long one. On November 12, 1908,
Mexico's Constitution was amended to allow the federal congress to legislate on
matters related to the general health and well being of society. On June 8, 1926, the
Sanitary Code incorporated a list of prohibited controlled substances, including
opium, morphine, cocaine, and heroin. During the administration of Ldzaro
Cdrdenas (1934 - 1940), the fight against drugs received a special chapter in the
administration's National Development Plan.2 In fact, Mexico's eradication
campaign is one of the most effective and oldest in the world, with a daily average
of 20,000 soldiers eradicating illicit plants. 3 Yet drug trafficking has been very
difficult to combat and has taken its toll on Mexico during recent years.
Mexico fights drug trafficking for three reasons: to promote the health of
Mexico's people, to elevate national security, and to increase international
cooperation. In today's world, countries can no longer be classified solely as
producers, distributors or consumers. Countries that were formerly labeled as
producers or distributors are beginning to become consumers as well.4 Likewise,
countries that were formerly consumers are now producing an important share of the
world's illicit drugs.5

* LLB (Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, 1986), MPA (Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios
Superiores de Monterrey, Mexico City, 1989), Graduate Course in American Legal Studies (Univ. of New Mexico,
Albuquerque, 1991), LLM candidate (Universidad lberoamericana), SJD candidate (American University). Mr.
Labardini is head of Chief of the Special Affairs Section at the Embassy of Mexico and is Professor on-leave of
International Law at U. lberoamericana. All opinions are of strictpersonal character and are not the opinions of any
institution with which he is associated.
I. Ley Federal Contra la Delincuencia Organizada (LFDO), published in the Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n (DOF) on November 7, 1996, as amended, available at http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfo/pdf/l01 .pdf/
(last visited April 2, 2003). All Mexican legislation herein cited can be accessed at the same website hosted by the
Chamber of Deputies of Mexico's Federal Congress. All translations of legal texts are provided by the author.
2. Efrafn Garcfa Ramirez, DROGAS, ANALISIS JURDICO DEL DELITO CONTRA LA SALUD, Editorial Sista,
Mexico City, 1997, p. 99.
3. "Mexico's eradication program is one of the oldest and largest in the world. Most drug crop cultivation
occurs in small fields located in remote areas to evade detection and eradication. Since lands used for illicit
cultivation are subject to seizure, many growers use public or communal lands to avoid tracing ownership." Dept.
OfStatc, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT- 2001, delivered March I st, 2002, see chapter
on Mexico, p. V - 28.
4. While consumption in Mexico is not yet an epidemic phenomenon, it has grown significantly in the past
years. According to data of the Mexican National Council Against Addictions (Consejo Nacional Contra las
Adiocciones[CONADIC), in 1988,2.99% of the Mexican population smoked marijuana, and in 1998 it was 4.70%;
cocaine was used by 0.33% and 1.45%. respectively; and heroin went from 0.1 1% to 0.9% between 1988 and 1998.
UNAM, Se incrementa el consumo de drogas ilicitas en Mexico: Navarro Paredes, BOLETfN UNAM-DGCS-0772,
Sep. 1,2002.
5. The U.S. is presumably one of the world's largest producers of marijuana and synthetic drugs. Eg, the
U.S. is estimated to be producing approximately 2/3 of its domestic illicit marijuana market. Ex. gr. "Marijuana
production and consumption is a serious problem in many countries-including in the United States. More than
10,000 metric tons (MT) of domestic marijuana and more than 5,000 metric tons of marijuana is cultivated and
harvested in Mexico and Canada and marketed to more than 20 million users in the United States." Dept. Of State,
INTERNATIONAL NARcoTics CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT - 2002, delivered March 1st, 2003, see subchapter
Marijuana in the chapter on Policy and Program Developments, p. If - 7.
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Mexico is firmly convinced that the only way to combat drug trafficking is
through international cooperation. International cooperation occurs when a region,
several countries, or simply two countries, like Mexico and the United States,
collaborate together, define mutually acceptable rules, create strategies, and then
commit themselves to complying and abiding by those rules and strategies.6 This
necessitates respect to the sovereignty and legislation of other countries, especially
allies. Thus, the only way that Mexico and the United States can really fight the war
against organized crime is through an internationally waged effort that is
coordinated among all parties. It is clear that no State can overcome this problem

in an isolated manner.
International organized crime is basically defined as a structure of three of more
persons organizing themselves in order to commit a crime.7 It is considered a highly

evolved type of crime.8 In some sense, it is a "perfected" crime. Furthermore, it is

an expression of globalization. 9 Many times, a debate about organized crime begins
when a consensus has been reached about that crime, whether organized or not. The
crime itself then exceeds the government's capacity to apply the rule of law to a
group of criminals.
Today, organized crime, drug cartels, and terrorism are run by intelligent and
sophisticated groups of criminals. They have state-of-the-art communication
systems. They are highly developed users of technology and computers and are
Law
increasingly turning to encryption to hide their unlawful activities.1 t

6. As in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204

(amended by 1972 Protocol) [hereinafter Single Convention], or the United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 l.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
7. The term "organized crime" was first used by John Ladesco in 1929 referring to criminal operations
carried out by "mafias". Procuradurfa General de laReptiblica (PGR) [Mexico's Attorney General's Office).
Organized Crime, http://wwwenglish.pgr.gob.mx/home.htm (last visited April 3,2003). The term came into regular
use among members of the Chicago Crime Commission (CCC), a civic organization created in 1919 by
businessmen, bankers and lawyers to promote changes in the criminal justice system in order to better cope with
the crime problem. The CCC referred not to the criminal organization itself, but in a broader sense to the orderly
fashion in which the so-called "criminal class" of an estimated "10,000 professional criminals" in Chicago allegedly
could pursue "crime as a business". Klaus von Lampe, The Concept of Organized Crime in Historical Perspective,
http://people.freenet.delkvlampellauhtm0l.htm (visited April 3, 2003). The CCC focused on conditions that
ostensibly allowed criminals to secure a steady income from delinquency, especially property crimes, under virtual
impunity. The CCC blamed both the city's government (for being incompetent, inefficient and corrupt) and the
general public (for indifference and even open sympathy towards criminals). "This characterization of organized
crime as an integral part of society apparently reflected the perspective of theold established protestant middle class
on Chicago as a city that, after years of rapid growth and cultural change, was drowning in crime, corruption and
moral decay." Ibid.
8. This type of crime is referred to as "organized" because it refers to the "association", the "society", the
'group", the "corporation", the "sindicate", the "union", the "coalition", the "league", the "grernio". In essence, it
alludes to the group as an entity, as a unit able to link, enhance and coalesce the individual member's efforts into
one enormous thrust in achieving one result: a criminal offence that will reap benefits to every member in
accordance to the hierarchy established within the association.
9. Moisds Nafm, The Five Wars ofGlobalization, 134 FOREIGN POLICY 28 (January/February 2003).
10. "For example, the Subcommittee learned that an international terrorist, who was plotting to blow up I I
U.S. airliners, recorded his terrorist plans on his laptop computer files-which were encrypted. A multi-state
gambling enterprise used encryption to hide its records of the daily take on bets, payoffs, and accounts due. A major
international drug lord recently used encryption to frustrate acourt-approved wiretap. And the numbers of criminals
using encryption are doubling each year". Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information,
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, CRIME, TERROR, & WAR: NATIONAL SECURITY & PUBLIC SAFETY
INTHE INFORMATION AGE, SUBCOMMITTEE ACCOMPLISHMENTS INTt-EI 105TH CONGRESS, REPORT SUBMITTED BY

MAJORITY STAFF, November 1998, p. 23.
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enforcement agencies are in unanimous agreement that widespread use of encryption
technology ultimately will devastate their ability to fight such criminal activities,
unless public safety features are built in into encryption products or architectures.
For example, the highly encrypted cellular phones and communications systems
used by drug traffickers are so encoded that U.S. law enforcement agencies have
great difficulties breaking them, and sometimes are unable to do so. " This fact does
not bode well for the Mexican efforts, or the efforts of any other country with less
technological resources, being able to crack the case.
Organized crime carries out its illegal activities with the use of violence,
intimidation, force, and corruption. Intimidation is common and reaps great benefit
because the criminals wield enormous power without exercising force and because
they feed on the population's natural fears. Most organized crime groups have
independent economic power within their own turf. They also wield the political
power to keep their operations safe and foster their economical and social power.
In some areas, just being a part of one of these groups provides certain social
standing or social stature. In Mexico's northern state of Sonora, being invited to
parties thrown by drug traffickers is symbolic of high social standing. 2 Authorities
do not always know who is a drug trafficker and who is not. Therefore, people
attend these parties to climb the social ladder without considering it a bad thing for
society as a whole. After all, they say, it is the authority's responsibility, not theirs,
to root out the criminals. However, this balancing of dual roles in society will
eventually break up social cohesion.' 3
The strength of organized crime lies in the alliances it creates among social actors
and the illicit links it develops in society. Strong and illegal relations are developed
between political, legal, individual, and military sectors. Their strength lies
precisely in the illegality of their associations.
When the operation extends internationally, it becomes a transnational organized
crime. In general, there are not sufficient legal apparatuses to effectively deal with
criminals acting across international borders. The result is impunity, a void in the
application of the law, a disruption of societal relations, and economic regulations
that have no reality, further allowing lack of enforcement.
Further, the criminal operation can be very broad. It encompasses financial,
commercial, securities, protection rackets, fraud, money laundering, illegal
acquisition of property, and prostitution, among other activities. Thus, you may find

11.

At the House Armed Services Committee and House Select Intelligence Committee hearings on July
13 and July 14, 1999, respectively, Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis Frech testified. Both
opposed H.R. 850 (Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act), 106th Cong. 1st session (a similar bill,

S-798, 106th Cong., 1st session, was also introduced in the Senate). These officials admitted that 128-bit encryption
is available on foreign markets, but continued to oppose U.S. exports of that strength on the grounds that it would
speed up the pace at which criminals and terrorists around the world begin to use encryption. Nevertheless, Thomas
Constantine, former Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, conceded in his testimony that drug
lords have been increasingly relying on encryption to encode conversations since 1995, and in fact mentioned that
while in 1995 there were almost no encrypted communications between drug traffickers, during 1997 there had been
262 encrypted calls (the majority between the bosses in Mexico and their partners in the U.S.) that could not be deencrypted by DEA, allowing the flow of tons of cocaine. He added that during 1998, the number of encrypted calls
without any possibility of action rose to 519.
12. Personal conversation with three Sonoran citizens relating their lives during the 1990 decade.
13. For Mexican efforts to involve society in the general fight against corruption. See Rodrigo Labardini,
The Fight Against Corruption in Mexico, in this volume.
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that organized crime carries out its illegal activities in all spheres: financial,

commercial, banking, securities, stock exchange, corruption, extortion, money
laundering, gambling, slavery, trafficking of minors, of women, of migrants, etc.
There is no area that it does not touch. As long as the organization may reap
benefits, it will apply its structure to further any illicit conduct.
Criminal organizations generally have a highly centralized command structure.

A few constitute the small decision-making group. As with any corporation, they
have several departments a chief financial officer, a chief enforcement officer, and
a chief operations officer, as well as someone who deals with security or protection.
They keep very good track of their accounts, legal or not, and all of the
corresponding paperwork.' 4 They keep track of everything taking place in the

money trail' -- everything from where the money is to where it is being laundered
and the amount of the corresponding fee. Additionally, they control and keep
zealous care of the identity-brand name and trademark--of their product. When
they ship cocaine, heroin, or bricks, they put symbols to identify that "Los
Alacranes", or whatever name their organization uses, made the product. These

methods of identification are similar to a patent or copyright within the illicit
underworld.
The life of the organized crime group generally extends beyond that of its
individual members. They may die a natural death, or sometimes not, but the
organization keeps on because all developments are viewed in an organizational
way. For instance, just as financial officers are substituted in a legitimate
corporation, a criminal overseeing the financial aspects of the illicit trade can be
substituted as well. However, although corporations tend to coalesce once again,
when organized crime groups are disrupted, they seem to learn a lesson and do not

immediately try to reconstitute themselves. 6 Rather, they reorganize themselves in
smaller groups guided by second or third lieutenants of the old organization. For
example, several of the big organized crime operations in Mexico have been
broken,' 7 but smaller organizations have begun to proliferate. " This seems to be the

14. Official banking accounts used to launder illicit proceeds and those used to keep tabs and control of their
daily financial activities, i.e., what may John Doe owe them and when was it due.
15. In fact, such record keeping assists law enforcement authorities in the fight against crime. "The Cali
cartel kingpins were entrepreneurs who had invested heavily into commercial enterprises ... In addition, the
kingpins were compulsive record keepers, whose records were eventually seized by the Colombia National Police
and made available to U.S. authorities." Mary Lee Warren, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, Statementbefore the JudicialReview Commission on Foreign Asset Control, September
21, 2000, pg. 5. The testimony may also be found in Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Asset Control, INAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS (January 2001), Appendices, Volume 1,at E-1, E-5.
16. Save for territory keeping and preserving their individual lives in the normally ensuing internal fighting
after a group has been dismantled at the top.
17. Additionally, the ProcuraduriaGeneralde la Republica (FGR), or Mexico's Attorney General's Office,
other law enforcement entities, and the military services successfully targeted all seven major drug-trafficking
organizations in Mexico. Among the most prominent actions included the capture by military units of the Arellano
Felix Organization (AFO) kingpin Benjamin Arellano Felix in Puebla, just one month after his brother, also a
kingpin, was killed in a shoot-out.
18. The AFO was not completely destroyed with the capture of Benjamin Arellano Fdlix and the death of
his brother Ram6n. AFO had already begun the modem route followed by criminal organizations: it was in the
process of establishing and coordinating smaller groups. AFO had very strong links in all of the Baja California
Peninsula, and the states of Sonora and Sinaloa in Mexico's Pacific Coast, the states of Michoacfn, Guerrero,
Oaxaca, and the Federal District, as well as the state of Veracruz and other regions in the Gulf of Mexico. See Jorge
Femndez Mendndez, Elfuturo de NarcotrdficoS.A., DIARIO MILENIO, Mexico City, March 12, 2002.
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trend for drug trafficking organizations. Large cartels have become non-operational
in Mexico and have transferred their structures to smaller organizational cells, to the
point in which they lend amongst themselves drug routes, corrupt officials and even

the territories in which they operate. 9 This way they can be more effective because,
by not being so big, they do not attract so much attention. They also become more
efficient regionally and locally. They may not operate as internationally as the
larger groups, such as the defunct El Senor de los Cielos (The Lord of the Skies),
but they are very efficient locally. This growing diversification of trafficking

organizations - with smaller groups interacting with one another to transfer illicit
drugs from source to market - and the diversification of routes and methods pose

major challenges for Mexican and international anti-narcotics programs.'
The division of labor is usually rigidly hierarchical. Everyone knows what their

job is and what and when they must perform it. Lower level criminals trying to
bump off higher-ups disrupt the hierarchy, the loyalty, and the social ties of the

organization.
In the legal field, Mexico has been doing many things to address this problem.
In 1990, Mexico executed the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and PsychotropicSubstances.2 In 1991, one year later,
there was a draft for a Mexican Federal Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse Act."2
Unfortunately, this did not develop further, because a consensus had not yet
developed in the Mexican legal community about the definition of organized crime,
nor about how much personnel and resources the government could commit against

such criminal activities.
In 1993, the concept of organized crime was finally agreed upon and was

incorporated into Mexico's legal system. That entailed a reform to Article 16 of
Mexico's Constitution, basically detailing that the maximum detention period of 48
hours is doubled in cases of organized crime.2 3 In 1994, the Federal Criminal

19. The large cartels have become non-operational because they are easily identified, their movements are
slower, their organization is easier to detect. Hence, they modernized themselves and restructured into operacional
cells. These cells arecoordinated, in constant communication and do not act independently. These atomization of
their activities complicates law enforcement efforts in Mexico. Josd Luis Vasconcelos, head of PGR's Specialized
Unit Against Organized Crime (Unidad Especializadacontra laDelincuenciaOrganizada) [UEDO], estimates that

this form of operation has taken place since 1999. Itwas discovered specifically in the AFO, when several members
were arrested: lsmael Higuera Guerrero, El Mayel; Jests El Chuy Labra Avilds; Gilberto Higuera Guerrero, El
Gilillo, y Rigoberto Yfilez Guerrero, El Primo. Gustavo Castillo Garcia and Socorro Castaileda Martin Sanchez,
Crean cdrteles grupos pequefios para evitar ser detectados, LA JORNADA, Mexico City, April I1,
2001.
20. Additionally, see George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Statement preparedfor delivery before
the Senate Select Conmmittee on Intelligence on the "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing

World'; 07 February 2001.
21. Vienna Convention, supra, note 6. See http:/www.incb.orglelconv/1988 (visited Feb.12, 2003).
22.

PGR,

Historical

Background

of

the

Federal

Law

Against

Organized

Crime,

http://wwwenglish.pgr.gob.mx/home.htm (last visited April 3, 2003).
23. Mex. Const., art. 16(7), availableat www.cddhcu.gob.mxlleyinfo/pdf/i.pdf (last visited April 3, 2003).
"Ning(in indiciado podrd ser retenido por el Ministerio Pgblico por mis de cuarenta y ocho horas, plazo en que
deberd ordenarse su libertad o pondrsele a disposici6n de laautoridad judicial; este plazo podrd duplicarse en
aquellos casos que laIcy prevea como delincuencia organizada. Todo abuso a Ioanteriormente dispuesto serd
sancionado pot Ia Icy penal.". Id. The congressional committees alluded to several criteria for organized crime:
the permanence of the criminal activities committed, their lucrative nature, the degree of complexity of the
organizations, the purpose of the association as the commission of crimes that affect fundamental individual and
collective rights and goods and that also seriously affect the public health and security.
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Procedures Code was modified to incorporate this change. 2' Also in 1994, the
ProcuraduriaGeneralde la Republica(PGR), Mexico's Attorney General's Office,
drafted the Strategy to Combat Organized Crime emphasizing that only inter-agency
strategy and coordination could contain organized crime. That is, the PGR by itself
cannot do it. It requires the assistance of the Defense Ministry, the Marina Ministry,
the Hacienda, and the Foreign Affairs Ministries, among others as well. Today,
following a new integral approach, fifteen federal cabinet ministries and all of the
Mexican states' Attorney General's Offices are involved with national security in
the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking.25
In order to adequately fight organized crime, Mexico had to reorganize itself.
One of the first things was the creation of CENDRO, Centro Nacional para la

Planeaci6ny Control de Drogas, the National Planning Center Against Drugs,26

which has been very useful functioning as a coordinating center to receive and
dispatch information. In the second semester of 2002, CENDRO was transformed
into the National Center for Planning Against Organized Crime. 7 This unit
currently oversees and analyzes information related with organized crime and eleven
additional crimes, 28 instead of information only related to drug trafficking and
weapons-related offenses.
Next, an agency exclusively designed to combat drug trafficking was established.
Originally called the Instituto Nacional Contra las Drogas, National Institute to

Against Drugs, the infamous INCD,2 9 it was later replaced by FEADS, Fiscalfa
Especializada para la Atenci6n de los Delitos Contra la Salud, Specialized

Prosecutor Against Drug Trafficking. This agency coordinates the national, regional
and local programs against organized crime. Further, the LFDO provides that the
PGR must have a dedicated unit specialized in the investigation and prosecution of

24. Art. 194-bis refers to doubling of warrantless arrest in cases of organized crime. See
http:/Iwww.eddhcu.gob.mxlleyinfo/pdfT.pdf (last visited April 3, 2003).
25. Ministries of Gobemacin (SEGOB). Foreign Affairs (SRE), National Defense (SEDENA), Navy
(SEMAR), Public Security (SSP), Finance and Public Credit (SHCP), Social Development (SEDESOL),
Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), Economy (SE), Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development,
Fisheries, and Food (SAGARPA), Communications and Transport (SCT), Public Education (SEP). Health (SSA),
Agrarian Reform (SRA), the Attorney General's Office (PGR), plus the Attorney General's Offices of Mexico's
thirty-one states, of the Federal District and the Military Attorney General. Poder Ejecutivo Federal, PROGRAMA
NACIONAL DE COMBATE ALAS DROGAS 2001 - 2006, see http://www.pgr.gob.mx (last visited April 4, 2003). and
Poder Ejecutivo Federal, INFORME DE EECUC16N DEL PROGRAMA NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO 2001 - 2006,
PRIMER INFORME DE EJEcUCION 2001, pg. 465.
26. CENDRO - drafts guidelines against drugtrafficking, recognizing first and foremost that drugtrafficking
is due to organized crime.
27. Centro Nacional de Planeaci6n e Informacidn contra Ia Delincuencia Organizada (CENDRO) of PGR.
28. See infra, note 43, text following.
29. In February 1997, General Jestis Gutierrez Rebollo, the military officer appointed in December 1996
as Commissioner of INCD was arrested on narco-corruption charges. After the arrest, U.S.-Mexico relations became
extremely tense, especially in face of the so-called narcotics "certification" procedures (§489 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. §2291). For additional background see Rodrigo Labardini, El
Proceso Estadounidense sobre "Certificaci6n " de otros Estados en [a Lucha contra el Narcotrdfico, EL FORO,
ORGANO DE LA BARRA MEXICANA, COLEGIO DE ABOGADOs, A.C., Ddcima 9poca, Tomo XI, Ndmero 1, Primer

Semestre 1998, Mdxico, D.F., pp. 129 - 182. Guti'rrez Rebollo is currently serving a sentence inexcess of 70 years.
Between 1997 and 2001. three other generals were charged in civilian courts with drug trafficking: Jorge Mariano
Maldonado Vega, Alfredo Navarro Lara and Ricardo Martinez Perea. During the Fox administration two other
generals were similarly charged (Arturo Acosta Chaparro and Francisco Quir6s Hermosillo) and were the first to
found guilty by military courts. Precedentes militates, REFORMA, Mexico City, November 2, 2002.
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offenses committed by members of organized crime.3° Accordingly, the PGR
created the Unidad Especializada contra la Delincuencia Organizada (UEDO),
Specialized Unit Against Organized Crime, on April 30, 1997. In order to become
a member of UEDO or FEADS, one must pass several examinations including
medical and physical fitness, toxicological, psychological, social background,
financial situation, and polygraphs (or lie detectors).3'
During this process, the need for constitutional reform arose. In August of 1996,
the Attorney General summarily dismissed for corruption 737 agents of the Policia
Judicial Federal,the federal judicial police. 32 Unfortunately, throughout the span
of two years, around 500 of those individuals had to be rehired, because even if they
were corrupt, they still had labor rights. 33 Additionally, there was not enough
evidence to charge them criminally. Thus, the Constitution impeded the Attorney
General from firing them. However, they were not reassigned to the same units,
especially not to sensitive units. Some are still working, but authorities are now
compartmentalizing procedures and analysis in order to prevent compromising
information. The agents that had to be rehired are only given discrete and clear-cut
tasks, while others manage and analyze the information they gather. The
accumulated information has generally been successful and most notably has led to
the arrest of Benjamfn Arellano F6lix, which was jointly executed by PGR and the
Mexican military. Additionally, the Constitution was amended to allow mechanisms
for removal of public officials (which includes agents) who do not meet the
requirements under the laws in force at the time of dismissal, which must be
complied with in order to remain in their post. In the event of unjustified dismissal,
financial compensation will be offered, but not reinstatement.34
During 1995, a first draft of an organized crime bill was presented to society
through several academic and legal fora, conferences, and debates, including the
National Consultation to Combat Drugtrafficking. In March of 1996, a bill was
submitted to congress. The bill was approved on October 18, 1996. The changes
proposed to Mexico's legal system were so sweeping in scope that they required
several constitutional amendments. 35 The amendments dealt with the possibilities
of intervening of private communications (wire-tapping), punishment reduction
(similar to plea bargaining), rewards for validated and effective information given
to the authorities, anonymous collaboration (i.e., anonymous tips), witness
protection, and withholding the identity of witnesses.
30. LFDO, supra note 1, art. 8.
31. Tests are applied bi-annually, once after giving notice, the second on a random basis, to members of
PGR's sensitive units: FEADS, UEDO, and the Specialized Unit Against Money Laundering (UnidadEspecializada
contra el Lavado de Dinero) [UELD].
32. See inter alia Juan Manuel Venegas y Ciro Pdrez Silva, Habrd "auditoriaexhaustiva "de la Contralor'a
a la direccihn de la PJF, LA JORNADA, Mexico City, August 22, 1996.

33. Also, Mexico's Supreme Court had previously ruled that the relationship between agents and the State
was of an administrative nature. Jests Aranda, Segdin la SCJN la relacirncon ellos es administrativa y no laboral,
LA JORNADA, Mexico City, July 1, 1996.

34. Mex. Const., supra note 23, art. 123(B)(XIII)(3). "Members of the police institutions of municipalities,
federal states, the Federal District and the Federation, can be removed from their posts if they do not comply with
the requirements that the laws in force at the time of their dismissal stipulate. Their reinstatement or restitution is
not mandated, whatever the action or means of defense against dismissal, only compensation will be in order. The
dismissal of other public servants referred to in this subparagraph will be governed by the provisions of the laws
applicable," (author's translation).
35. Articles 16, 20 (1), 21, 22. and 73 (XXI) had to be amended.
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These amendments and the enactment of the Ley FederalContra la Delincuencia
Organizada (LFDO), Federal Organized Crime Act, allowed Mexican law
enforcement agencies to start developing new schemes and in fact generated whole
new areas of cooperation with the United States. Possibly the most important was
36
the authorization to use wire-tapping or intervention of private communication.
This was not limited to telephone communications and may be applied to intervene
any private communication. 7 Additionally, the advent of something similar to pleabargaining was introduced." As in the United States, Mexican authorities can now
rely on anonymous informants39 and offer witness protection 40 or other benefits to
criminals that collaborate with the authorities."
Organized crime is defined in Mexico 42 as three or more individuals organized
43
to permanently or repeatedly try to commit one of the following eleven crimes:
terrorism,
drug trafficking,45 counterfeiting," money laundering,
arms
trafficking,48 trafficking of migrants, 49 trafficking of organs, 0 robbery, 5'
kidnapping,52 trafficking of minors,53 and car theft.54 The Organized Crime Act was
a huge conceptual change in Mexico.
However, the new anticrime legislation is still under criticism. 55 According to
some, a fundamental difference exists between the criminal systems of the United
States and Mexico. In the United States, criminal action is managed and decided by
the prosecutor. In Mexico, the prosecutor is society's representative and thus has
no possibility to allow criminals or defendants to fall into witness protection

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Mex. Const., supra note 23, art. 16(9), and LFDO, supra note 1, arts. 8 and 15 - 28.
Id.
LFDO, supra note 1, art. 35 (11).
Id, at art. 38.
Id., at art. 34.
Id., at arts. 35 - 39.

42. Id., at art. 2.
43. On the other hand, art. 164-bis of the Federal Criminal Code (FCC) distinguishes between organized
crime and gangs. The latter are defined as "habitual, occasional or transitory association or three or more persons
that without being organized for criminal purposes commit some crime," (author's translation). See
http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfc)/pdf/9.pdf (last visited April 3, 2003).
44. Id., at art. 139.
45. Id., at arts. 194- 195.
46. Id., at arts. 234, 235 and 237.
47. Id., at art. 400-bis.
48.

FederalAct on Firearmasand Explosives, published in the DOFon January 11, 1972, as amended, arts.

83-bis and 84, available at www.cddhcu.gobmx/leyinfo/pdf/102.pdf (last visited April 3, 2003).
49. Trafficking of migrants is denominated as traffic of undocumented persons and typified in Mexico in
article 138 of the Ley GeneraldePoblacidn (General Acton Population) published in the DOFon January 14, 1974,
as amended, as the attempt to or the transport of Mexicans or foreigners to enter into another country without the
proper documentation. http:f/www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfotpdfll40.pdfl.
50. Ley General de Salud, published in the DOFon February 7, 1984, as amended (General Health Act),
arts. 461,462, and 462-bis, availableat http:lwww.ddheu.gob.mxlleyinfotpdf/142.pdf (last visited April 2,2003).
51. FCC, supra note 43, arts. 286 and 287, and the corresponding provisions included in local criminal
legislation.
52. Id., at art. 366, and the corresponding provisions included in local criminal legislation.
53. Id., at art. 366-ter, and the corresponding provisions included in local criminal legislation.
54. Id., at art. 381-bis, and the corresponding provisions included in local criminal legislation.
55. E.g., while Justice Juventino Castro y Castro voted in favor of LFDO's constitutionality, he has criticized
the legislation as an "illiterate copy" of the old U.S. model. In a presentation on the panorama of penal sciences in
Mexico, he criticized legislators and specialists who participated in the design and approval of the law because "it
is not inspired in a congruous form with our traditional penal norms," (author's translation). See EXCtLSIOR,
Mexico City, September 3, 2002.
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programs or bargain sentences. For instance, if criminal action is executed on behalf
of society, on what account are sentences reduced or impunities created? Further,
some argue that these changes go against Mexico's legal culture, by falsely
conveying 6 that criminal liability is a merchandise to be bartered and allowing
impunity.
INTERVENTION OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS

Intervention of private communications is probably the most important element
of LFDO, and enables law enforcement authorities to identify and locate members
of a criminal organization. It is generally the first evidentiary element submitted to
dismantle a criminal group. In order to issue an order allowing intervention of
private communications, a Federal Judge must verify that there are sufficient indicia
that a person is a possible member of a criminal organization and such intervention
is the only proper means to obtain the necessary information.57 However, there have
been difficulties administering the law in the courts. We are in the midst of a
learning process and not exempt of controversy.5 8
Only a ministerio ptiblico, or federal prosecutor, who is commissioned with the
UEDO unit, may request a wiretap, 9 and constitutional law establishes that no judge
can issue a wiretap for anything related to electoral, fiscal, commercial, civil, labor,
60
or administrative issues, as well as communications between counsel and client.
This is something to keep in mind in light of the very important changes introduced
in the United States legal system with the USA PATRIOT Act6 that allows some
intervention into the attorney-client privilege.
UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS

The Attorney General is in charge of the authorization and supervision of the
LFDO's provisions that allow for official undercover operations, 62 which is a very
difficult and sensitive issue. 63 The program was developed in cooperation with the

56. Justice Castro considers that LFDO has very laudable objectives but poor legal integrity. Jesds Aranda,
Consenso en la SCJN para eliminar la 'fyrntmla Otero": Castro y Castro, LA JORNADA, Mexico City, June 28,
2000. Nevertheless Justice Castro voted in favor of the Supreme Court's LFDO's constitutionality ruling. See notes
55 and 84.
57. LFDO, supra note 1,art. 15.
58. Justice Juventino Castro y Castro has repeatedly criticized LFDO because he has considered it
unconstitutional and distorting of Mexico's criminal system. Carlos Avils Allende, Impugnan narcos a la UEDO,
EL UNIVERSAL, Mexico City, April 19, 2002, p. 5. Nevertheless, when Mexico's Supreme Court ruled on the
constitutionality of LFDO, Justice Castro voted approvingly. See notes 55 and 84. Also see Gabriel Regino, La
intervencidn de

las comunicaciones privadas en Mexico, KO'AGA

RONEETA

se.vii

(1997).

See

http://www.derechos.org/vii/regino2.htnl. http://www.derechos.ory/koaga/vii/resino2.html (last visited September
17, 2002).
59. LFDO, supra note I. arts. 8(4) and 15 - 28.
60. Mex. Const., supra note 23, art. 16.
available at
Congress,
107th
2001,
24,
Oct.
RDS,
3162
61. HR
bill.html (last visited
http://www.eff.orzlPrivacy/SurveillanceTerrorism militias/20011025 hr3162 usa patriot
Feb.12, 2003).
62. LFDO, supra note 1,art. 11.
63. After the "Operation Casablanca" was announced, in which several U.S. law enforcement agents carried
out undercover activities in Mexico without the U.S. government informing Mexican authorities of such activities,
Mexico protested Operation Casablanca for the use of unilateral activities, hindrance of bilateral anticrime
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United States.' Agents infiltrate the criminal organizations in order to gather
information that will assist in dismantling them. Information is also gathered
regarding all persons constituted to foster illicit purposes. It is a highly useful
element because it allows law enforcement to know the structure and actual

operation of the criminal organization, as well as its area of influence. Agents may
spend long and difficult periods in undercover operations. The United States
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports that agents who spend long periods

undercover can suffer tensions from maintaining dual personalities. 65 During the
time the agent is infiltrated, he or she behaves like a criminal in order to gather
information. It is then difficult to incorporate the individual into normal society
once again. To do so requires retraining, rehab, and psychological help, and because
Mexico has limited experience in this area, cooperation between Mexico and the
United States is very important.
RESERVATION OF IDENTITY

The LFDO also allows the government to withhold the identity of witnesses

testifying against organized crime.'

It is important to note that the confidentiality

of the identity of the witness is kept only during the investigation phase, or durante

la averigacirnprevia. Once it gets to the judicial process and criminal action has

been instituted, the information must be disclosed.67 The possibility to reserve the

identity of a possible witness is an innovative tool in Mexico's criminal system
established to protect individuals that can provide helpful information that may lead
to the eventual location and arrest of criminals.
PROTECTION OF PERSONS

The measures protecting persons were created to safeguard the integrity and

security of persons collaborating or participating in the investigation and
prosecution of organized crime and its members. They ensure the physical, moral
and psychological integrity before any danger, intimidation, or reprisal arises. These
cooperation, and as a serious violation of Mexico's sovereignty. See Laundering 'milestone' reachedas two Mexican
banks convicted, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, May 1999. Mexico denied, on February 7, 1999, the extradition

requests of five Mexicans charged with money laundering. Embassy of Mexico in the U.S.A., Government of
Mexico Announces Decisions on "Operation Casablanca", Press Release, Bol-99-17, Feb. 7, 1999. Nonetheless,

all five of them were tried in Mexican courts for the alleged offenses pursuant to FCC, arts. 4 and 9(2) of the U.S.Mexico Extradition Treaty (Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T 5059. For the official text of
the Treaty in Spanish, see DOF, Feb. 26 and May 16,1980). The U.S. government did not highly criticize the denial
of the extraditions, presumably as a way to assuage Mexican concerns in the "Casablanca" aftermath.
64. On January 20, 2000, in a hearing with Mexico's Senate, Mexico's Attorney General stated that an
undercover operation had been undertaken by a U.S. citizen, of which an official of the Ministry of Finance (SCHP)
had been advised. The operation was contemplated in LFDO and the Memorandum of Understanding for
Proceduresfor Cooperation Between Law Enforcement Agencies of the United States and Mexico executed in

Merida, Yucatan, Mexico, on February 15, 1999. Andrea Becerril and Jos4 Galdn, El secreto del operativo
narcofosas, "porfaltade credibilidad en las autoridades", LA JORNADA, Mexico City, January 21, 2000. The

Merida MOU was a follow-up to the "Brownsville Letter" of July 25, 1998, which Mexican Attorney General
Madrazo and U.S. Attorney General Reno had hurriedly agreed upon in order to alleviate the strained U.S.-Mexico
relationship after "Operation Casablanca", especially in the law enforcement cooperation field.
65. Michael J.Sniffen, FBlAgent Sues Over Misconduct, Associated Press, Nov. 4, 2000.
66. LFDO, supra note 1,art. 14.
67. Id.
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measures may be instituted during the investigation phase (averiguacidnprevia) or
before, during, and after the criminal trial. Subject to protection are: 1) individuals
acting against organized crime: ministerio pdiblico agents, experts, and judges, 2)
people collaborating with the authorities: witnesses and members or organized
crime, 68 and 3) victims of organized crime.
Protection is provided when the person renders his official statement (testimony)
before a ministerio pdblico agent of UEDO and the information provided may
endanger such person. Law enforcement authorities have to verify the authenticity
and veracity of the information and consider if it may also be useful in other
investigations.
The type of support and protection given can be specific or global. Specific
conditions refer to judges, witnesses, experts, and victims, Global measures refer to
other individuals who are collaborating and who are in need of protection. 69 This
group includes relatives, spouses, concubines and those living with said persons,
collateral relatives up to the second degree, as well as individuals linked by love,
respect, gratitude, or friendship to the witness or those collaborating with the
authority. The government can offer many kinds of protection, including
bodyguards, surveillance, witness protection, legal measures, or reserve of identity.7°
The protection is offered for as long as needed. Support given by the authorities
includes economic, medical, educational, labor, and home assistance. The
ministerio publico for UEDO makes these determinations, defining the details,
expenses, duration, and particular circumstances of the protection to be provided.
PLEA-BARGAINING

In Mexico, plea-bargaining is referred to as beneficios de la Iey, 71 or benefits of
the law. In Mexico's traditional legal culture, plea-bargaining has created some
controversy. In essence, it is the reduction of punishment that may be or has been
imposed on an individual in exchange for information. While the defendant may be
guilty, and should purge his or her sentence, he or she will not serve the full
sentence and may in fact not be convicted of all the crimes he or she may have
committed. In essence, plea-bargaining serves a utilitarian purpose by providing
incentives to both sides. The prosecutor can obtain more information about other
criminals in exchange for cooperation and it conserve judicial resources by avoiding
a trial on every charge.
If a member of organized crime collaborates with authorities and such assistance
provides important and relevant information leading to the arrest, capture, and
imprisonment of other members of the criminal group, such collaborator will receive
certain benefits, subject to his or her legal situation, whether as a suspect, a
defendant, or a convicted and sentenced criminal. The four hypothesis available are:
1) no previous indictment or criminal proceeding exists against the collaborator, 2)

68. This aspect of the witness protection programs have been criticized by Justice Juventino Castro as
generating impunity in Mexico. Nevertheless. when Mexico's Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of
LFDO, Justice Castro voted approvingly. See supra notes 55 and 84.
69. LFDO, supra note I, art. 34.
70. id.
71. Id., at art. 35.
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the collaborator is under investigation, 3) a criminal procedure has been initiated,
and 4) a sentence has been passed. If no investigation has begun, any evidence will
be discarded;72 if an investigation has begun, up to two thirds of the sentence may
be reduced;7 3 if criminal process has begun, one half of the sentence may be
reduced;74 and if the individual has been sentenced, two thirds of the sentence may
be reduced.75
However, a contradiction seems to exist in the law. Only criminals involved in
organized crime can receive these benefits.76 Thus, the worst criminals receive the
benefits of the law, which are not available to the common criminal. Furthermore,
sentence reduction has been considered to create impunity in Mexico. 77 Yet law
enforcement is achieving results, so perhaps the pragmatic aspects are triumphing
over the theoretical ones.
REWARDS

Rewards may now be offered and given to whoever assists in order to locate and
apprehend a criminal.78 Rewards are considered a tool for prevention and dissuasion
against criminals based on society's cooperation with law enforcement authorities.
Only the Attorney General of Mexico (AGM) is empowered to authorize these
rewards, and they will be subject to the terms and conditions set by the AGM.
Rewards are offered upon two conditions: 1) the sought after criminal must be a
member of an organized crime group already under investigation (averiguacin
previa), and 2) information provided must be essential to the capture of the wanted
criminal. In order to actually receive the reward, further conditions must be met as
well. An arrest warrant must have been issued based on investigations of the
member of the criminal organization. Information received by the authorities must
be true and useful for the suspect's arrest. All proceedings arising from the arrests
of members of criminal organizations shall be handled in federal courts.
ANONYMOUS INFORMATION

Anonymous information received by authorities must be verified by the
ministerioptiblico before it can be used.79 If the information provided and the facts
offered are verified to constitute a possible crime, authorities will begin the formal
investigation process, gathering available evidence and interrogating witnesses. It
is important to stress that anonymous information has no evidentiary value per se.

72. Id., at art. 35(l). This is granted by the investigative authority.
73. Id., at art. 35 (11).This benefit is requested by the prosecutor and granted by the judge,
74. Id., at art. 35 (111).This benefit is requested by the prosecutor and granted by the judge.
75. Id., at art. 35 (IV). This benefit is granted by the Ministry of Gobernacin (Interior), which is in charge
of the prison system.
76. Id., at arts. 35-39.
77. Such is the opinion of Justice Juventino Castro Aranda, supra note 56. Nevertheless, when Mexico's
Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of LFDO, Justice Castro voted approvingly. See supra notes 55 and
84.
78. LFDO, supra note i, art. 37.
79. ld., at art. 38.
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ARREST WARRANTS

Under the Organized Crime Act, a search warrant must be issued within twelve
hours of being requested."0 The judge must decide on it. However, if for some
reason a judge does not decide on the request, law enforcement authorities can take
the request to the appellate court immediately, which must also decide within twelve
hours. 8 ' This is a radical change for criminal prosecutions in Mexico because
Article 142 of the Federal Criminal Code for Criminal Procedure only requires that
the request for an arrest warrant be processed'within ten days.8 Appeals of a denial
83
of search warrant related with organized crime must be decided within 48 hours.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

LFDO

On June 25, 2002, after being strongly tested in the courts, the Surprema Corte
de Justicia de la Naci6n (SCJN), the Supreme Court of Mexico, ruled that LFDO
The decision is viewed as representing the judiciary's
is constitutional.8 4

commitment to fighting crime, especially after judges and justices had questioned
LFDO's constitutionality in 1996.85 This ruling was important due to its significant
implications on international cooperation efforts, including extradition.
Several members of the Arellano F61ix Organization (AFO) appealed the
constitutionality of LFDO. Five amparos(constitutional appeals similar to habeas
corpus) questioned the validity of 12 different articles of the LFDO, and, put into
question the very existence of the PGR's Unidad Especializada contra la
Delincuencia Organizada (UEDO), Specialized Unit Against Organized Crime. 6
The SCJN ruled that all provisions of LFDO under review were constitutional.
The Court ruled that the offense of "organized crime" 8 is an independent and not

a predicate crime, wherefore a person can be found guilty of organized crime itself,
and organized crime is not necessarily an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the eleven crimes88 predicating organized crime.8 9 Thus, holding

80. Id., at art. 15.
81. Id.
82. Codigo Federal de Procedinientos Penales, supra note 24.
83. LFDO, supra note 1, art. 15.
84. See Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Naci6n, Versidn Taquigrdfica de Ia Sesidn Ptiblica Ordinaria del
Pleno de la Suprerna Corte de Justicia de la Nacitin, Celebradael martes 25 dejunio de dos mil dos, Mexico City,
June 25, 2002 [hereinafter Public session]. Also, see Jests Aranda, Se stua la SCJN a la niano dura contra el
(rinlen. LA JORNADA, Mexico City, June 26, 2002.
85. See inter alia, supra notes 56 and 84.
S6. See Avilds, supra note 58.
87. LFDO, Articles 2 and 4.
88. See, supra notes 42 - 54.
89. " ... el solo acuerdo de la organizaci6n o [a organizaci6n misma, que tenga como fin cometer algunos
de los delitos precisados en [LFDO, Article 2], es suficiente para imponer las penas previstas en el artfculo 4 de
la Icy referida, con independencia de la sanci6n que le corresponda al ilfcito o ilfcitos cometidos. Acorde con lo
anterior, debe decirse que el ilfcito de ndrito no es una agravante de los diversos previstos en las fracciones del
citado artlculo 2' de la ley en cuesti6n, toda vez que las circunstancias seflaladas denotan la autonomfa del ilfcito
de delincuencia organizada, porque le dan vida propia, esto es, para su consumaci6n no requiere de la realizacidn
de otra conducta tipificada como delito". DELINCUENCIA ORGANIZADA. El delito previsto en el arteulo 2: y
sancionado en el articulo 4: arnbos de /a ley federal contra la misma, es autinonio y no una agravante. SCJN,
Pleno, TESIS NUM. XXV/2002, Amparo en revisi6n 173f2001.- 25 dejunio de 2002.- Unanimidad de once votos.Ponente: Sergio Salvador Aguirre Anguiano.- Secretario: Alberto Miguel Ruiz Matfas; Anparo en revisi6n
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people criminally liable if they associate with criminals to commit crimes does not
violate freedom of speech because communication and association to commit a

crime are not protected speech activities. What Article 2 of LFDO sanctions is the
agreement to constitute a criminal organization.' ° By holding that the "vicinity"

requirement is applicable only to members of a popular jury, but not to judges, the

Court ruled that Article 6 of LFDO was constitutional.9 Now a judge from one part

of the country can preside over a case involving a criminal from another part. In the
past, the judge had to be from the same locale as the criminal.
Further, the SCJN ruled that Article 4 of the Act is not an unusual and cruel
punishment. 92 The Court used an unusual and unique interpretation to arrive at this
ruling. It held that there was no unusual criminal punishment because the appealed

act was an auto deformal prision, or a judge's order for formal imprisonment of an
individual. Such an order only relates to probable cause without imposing any
sanction. Thus, it was not ruling on the Act itself. The Court distinguished the

LFDO from a judge's final decision to convict and sentence. LFDO was
constitutional because it is not until the judge completes his or her determination
process, and decides how many years of imprisonment to impose, that the prisoner
actually receives any criminal sanction. The decision is technically difficult and
probably means that the issue will arise again once the defendants actually receive
and begin serving their corresponding prison terms.
The Court further held that withholding informant and witness names and
identities until the initiation of judicial proceedings is constitutional.93 The SCJN
stated that "the constitutionality issue ...
of articles 14 and 34 [of LFDO] ...
should

444/2001.- 25 de junio de 2002.- Unanimidad de once votos.- Ponente: Josd Vicente Aguinaco Alerndn.- Secretaria:
Martha Yolanda Garcfa Verduzco; Amparo en revisidn 446/2001.- 25 de junio de 2002.- Unanimidad de once
votos.- Ponente: Juan Dfaz Romero.- Secretario: Gonzalo Arredondo Jimdnez.
90. The only limitations on freedom of speech are that it does not attack morality nor rights of third parties,
that it does not provoke the commission of an offense and that it does not perturb public order. DELNCUENCIA
ORGANIZADA. El artculo 2 * pdrrafo primero, de a ley de In materia, no viola lagaranda de libertad de,
expresidn consagradaen elartculo6 'de laconstitucidn federal. SCJN, Pleno, TESIS NUJM. XXVI/2002, Amparo
en revisi6n 173/2001.- 25 de junio de 2002.- Unanimidad de once votos.- Ponente: Sergio Salvador Aguirre
Anguiano.- Secretario: Alberto Miguel Ruiz Matfas; Amparo en revisi6n 444/2001.- 25 de junio de 2002.Unanimidad de once votos.- Ponente: Josd Vicente Aguinaco Alemdn.- Secretaria: Martha Yolanda Garcia
Verduzco; Amparo en revisi6n 446/2001.- 25 de junio de 2002.- Unanimidad de once votos.- Ponente: Juan Dfaz
Romero.- Secretario: Gonzalo Arredondo Jimdnez.
91. COMPETENCIA PENAL La garantaque atorga a los inculpados elartculo 20, apartado a,fracci6n
vi, constitucional,nose transgredepor lo"numerales6 ,pdrrafoprimero,y 10,pdrrafotercero,del c6digo federal
de procedimientospenales,que permiten conocerde un delito a unjuez de distrito distinto aldel lugar en que aqudl
se cometiM. SCJN, Pleno, TESIS NOM. XXIX12002, Amparo en revisidn 173/2001.- 25 de junio de 2002.Unanimidad de once votos.- Ponente: Sergio Salvador Aguirre Anguiano.- Secretario: Alberto Miguel Ruiz Matfas.
Amparo en revisi6n 444/2001.- 25 de junio de 2002.- Unanimidad de once votos.- Ponente: Jos Vicente Aguinaco
Alemdn.- Secretaria: Martha Yolanda Garcia Verduzco.
92. DEL/NCUENCIAORGANIZADA.Esinoperanteelargumentoconsistenteenqueelartculo4:fracci6n
i,inciso a), de In fey federal de In materia establece una pena inusitaday trascendentaly, por ende, es violatorio
del articulo 22 de a constitucidnfederal, cuando se reclama con motivo del auto deformal prisi6n. SCJN, Pleno,
TESIS NOM. XXX/2002, Amparo en revisi6n 446/2001.- 25 de junio de 2002.- Unanimidad de once votos.Ponente: Juan Dfaz Romero.- Secretario: Gonzalo Arredondo Jiminez.
93. DELINCUENCIA ORGANIZADA. Para que sea procedente laimpugnacidn en amparo,de los artdculos
14 y 34 de laley federal de lamateria, es necesarioque hayan sido aplicados en perjuiciode laparte inculpada,
lo cual s6lo ocurre si elministerio pdblico, antes del ejercicio de laaccidnpenal, le oculta laidentidad de los
testigos que declararonen su contra. SCJN, Pleno, TESIS NOM. XXXI/2002, Amparo en revisi6n 446/2001.- 25
de junio de 2002.- Unanimidad de once votos.- Ponente: Juan Dfaz Romero.- Secretario: Gonzalo Arredondo
Jimnez.
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be examined ... where the federal [prosecutor] before exercising criminal action
against the defendant had reserved or hidden the identity of the witnesses that
testified againsthim, but where from the investigation proceedings one can conclude
that names of the witnesses were included and the [prosecutor] provided them to the
indicted ... ", then there is no violation.' In other words, as long as it appears that
the government had recorded the names during the investigations (averiguacidn
previa), and this was given to the suspect, then there is no violation. However,
recall that LFDO provides that the authorities can withhold from the suspect any
information regarding an individual who is providing help or information until the
corresponding judicial procedure begins. '5 The informant's identity must be
revealed once the judicial procedure begins or there could be a violation. So,
according to the SCJN, authorities are allowed to keep the informant's identity
reserved and in full confidentiality but if the information was included in the
investigations and they gave it to the suspect, then it is okay. Yet, in a way, the
authorities would be violating their duty to maintain confidentiality, and presumably
limiting the potential effects of their investigation while also endangering the
individual whose identity was supposed to be reserved. Thus, the Court resorted to
an original legal argumentation to arrive at its decision in this quite contradictory
situation.
On the other hand, the SCJN's ruling is encouraging for future cases in front of
the Court. The decision may signal the Judiciary's commitment in the fight against
crime. 96 Mexico now has a pseudo-RICO Act 97 and is making important progress
against organized crime. The arrest of Benjamfn Arellano F6lix, the death of his
brother, and the dismantling of the Arellano Fdlix Organization (AFO) are the most
notable examples. Further, the Court also announced in its holdings that it
understands that the world is dealing with a new type of crime,98 which may explain
why the public session lasted only 15 minutes and the media was not formally
convened. 99
Accordingly, and remembering that on October 2, 2001, the SCJN ruled that
Mexico cannot extradite any person unless the Requesting State provides assurances

94. "debe estimarse que cl cuestionamiento de la constitucionalidad de los artfculos 14 y 34 de la Ley

Federal contra la Delincuencia Organizada, que facultan al Ministerio Pblico de [a Federaci6n a mantener bajo
reserva la identidad de las personas que rindan testimonio en contra de algtin miembro de la delincuencia
organizada, hasta el ejercicio de la acci6n penal, con la correlativa obfigaci6n de la Procuradurfa Federal de la
Repdblica de prestar apoyo y proteccidn suficientes a dichos testigos, s6lo procede set examinado en el juicio de
amparo, cuando el Ministerio Pdblico Federal, antes de ejercitar [a acci6n penal contra el inculpado, hubiere
mantenido en reserva o le haya ocultado ia identidad de los testigos que declararon en su contra, pero cuando de
las actuaciones de la averiguaci6n previa se desprende que se asent6 el nombre de cada uno de dichos testigos y el
Ministerio Pdblico los dio a conocer a la parte inculpada como las personas que deponen en su contra, y esta dltima
se manifest6 conocedora de sus identidades, es dable concluir que los artfculos citados no se aplicaron en la parte

que podrfa perjudicarle y que, por tanto, opera [a causal de improcedencia establecida en el artfculo 73, fraccidn VI,
de la Ley de Amparo." Id. (emphasis added) [author's translationl.

95. See supra note 67, text accompanying.
96. See inter alia, supra notes 56 and 84.
97. Racketeer Influencedand Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 - 1968.

98. During the intense debate about LFDO, that lasted for several months, the Justices became convinced
that crimes like drug trafficking, trafficking of persons and minors, trafficking of arms, and kidnapping, need to be
tackled by the authorities in a very particular ways, and thus, the corresponding punishments must also be
exemplary. Jesds Aranda, Podra cambiar la SCJN su postura sabre la pena capital, LA JORNADA, July i, 2002.
99. Id.
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that life imprisonment shall not be imposed,"° there have been reports that the SCJN
may reconsider its position on the life imprisonment in extradition issue.'' This is
attributed to the fact that SCJN has now realized the powers and the dangers posed
by organized crime and drug-trafficking. Mexico has new powers and new means to
combat crime. Yet the problem is huge and there is still a considerable need for new
units, more resources, and more vetting of agents. Nevertheless, the stage is set and
Mexico is hopeful that the courts, the administration, the legislature, and society will
go forward hand in hand.

100. For further informauion see Rodrigo Labardini, Mexico s Supreme Court to analyze whether extradition
is allowed where life imprisonment sentence may be imposed, 17 INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT LAW REPORTER
418 (October 2001), and Rodrigo Labardini, Extradition from Mexico allowed with assurances that life
imprisonment will not be imposed, 18 INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENTI LAW REPORTER 404 (October 2002).
101. Aranda, supra note 98.

